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Anarchism
and the Anti-Globalization Movement
by Barbara Epstein
Marxism and
the Social Sciences
by Maurice Dobb
Refusing to
Cooperate
by Lawrence Kaplan
Also by this
Author:
The Argentine
Crisis
Japan’s
Stagnationist Crises
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Aaron Forsberg, America and the
Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan’s Postwar Economic
Revival, 1950-1960(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina
Press, 2000), 332 pages, $45.
Historical research on postwar Japan and East Asia has produced a number of
high quality studies that have contributed to the formation of a political and
economic perspective not too distant from the Monthly Review conception
of the transformation of modern capitalism. These works point out that the
conditions for Japanese economic recovery were found not only in the
willingness of Japan’s capitalist elites to reignite the process of
industrial accumulation, but also in the propulsive role played by military
spending and by actual wars. This sort of spending was not done by Japan, but
by the United States—thereby helping Japanese capitalism, which had lost
all its areas of imperialistic influence, to find an anchor on which to start a
new wave of accumulation. It is legitimate to say that without such U.S.
spending, Japan’s economic recovery would have been much more problematic
and may not have happened in any sustained way.1
In this context, the view that Japan and Europe grew faster than the United
States because they had a comparatively smaller military budget is
misleading.2 American
military expenditure fueled the production and profits of the most advanced
components of U.S. monopoly capital as well as the economic expansion of Europe
and Japan. The links between American armament expenditures and capital
accumulation in Europe and Japan are manifold. Consider, for example, the
formation of NATO. The bulk of its costs were borne by the United States,
generating a flow of dollars to Europe that helped ease the dollar shortage of
the 1950s. At the same time, NATO’s military procurements were of crucial
importance for the modernization of, at least, the electronic and aviation
industries of the European countries. In the Japanese case, beginning with the
Korean War, the links are much clearer. American war orders uplifted the whole
industrial sector of the shattered Japanese economy. A decade later, the
American escalation in Vietnam “actually helped Japan reenter the
Southeast Asian economy.”3
America and the Japanese Miracle reveals additional evidence of this
process but, as we shall see, the historical role of the United States is
interpreted in a way that obscures the contradictions inherent in the system of
monopolistic capitalism. Forsberg starts by addressing Washington’s
postwar strategic objective of “keeping Japan on our side.” He
correctly points out, as Noam Chomsky and Gabriel Kolko did several years
earlier, that the other side was not the Soviet Union or China, but simply a
neutralism similar to that of Nehru in India. He does not tell us why such a
path should have been regarded as a threat. But Forsberg’s work is
entirely constructed on the premise that the Cold War was a response to a
threat, which sharpened the wit of U.S. policy makers in international
relations. The restoration of the power of Japan’s monopolistic groups
(Zaibatsus) is seen, in this context, as the product of the Cold War.
Yet there is evidence that salvaging Japan’s powerful monopolies was
already on the agenda of influential figures and bodies in Washington even
before Japan’s surrender.
U.S. strategy involved a special economic sponsorship of Japan, which
Forsberg illustrates very well, and with approval. The Washington-imposed
embargo on trade with the People’s Republic of China provided a major
justification for the all-embracing support given to Japan. The picture that
emerges is that the United States took unilateral actions, requiring unilateral
measures of protection, because Japan would otherwise have ceased to function.
Thus, contrary to the author’s own claim, Washington’s policies did
not stem from an enlightened attitude but were the logical corollary of the
hegemonic view of the world which matured within the U.S. government during the
Second World War. Sponsoring Japan entailed, however, a number of frictions and
conflicts. Japan’s desire to keep some trade relations with China could
not be altogether ignored, and had to be offset by other arrangements. The
substantial decline in the ties with China meant that an anchor for Japan could
be found only by opening up export markets in the United States, and possibly
elsewhere. The urgency of finding such outlets increased as the Korean War
approached its end, engendering a slow down in the demand for military related
supplies.
Domestically, therefore, the U.S. government had to mediate with business
groups, at the time mostly in the textile and apparel industry, which feared
Japanese competition. Internationally, the strategy required U.S. authorities
to coordinate with their allies, especially Britain and France. These countries
were reluctant to open their markets because of the perceived lack of
reciprocity from Tokyo. The diplomatic pressure became particularly intense
during the negotiations leading to Japan’s membership in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955. A similar pressure, we may add,
occurred when Japan applied to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development in 1964. In the first instance, Washington signed a dozen
trilateral treaties allowing third countries greater access to U.S.
markets—provided they waived the right to use GATT’s clause
thirty-five against Japan. This clause enabled a contracting nation to deny
GATT privileges to another when trade could injure domestic producers.
The discussion of the legal and political procedures of the GATT case is
most interesting. It illustrates how U.S. activities in support of Japan’s
entry into the organization constituted yet another step in the weakening of
the British position both in Asia and in the world. Japan’s membership in
GATT contributed to the demolition of the imperial system of preferences, which
was the pillar of British hegemony in the Commonwealth. Although not explicitly
stated by the author, the narrative of the book shows that shoring up Japan
implied extending American influence at the expense of Britain. The discussion
of Japan’s laws limiting foreign investment is informative, well written,
and one of the best sections of the book. The laws were passed when the country
was still under occupation. But why did the United States allow regulations
that ultimately discriminated against American multinationals? Unfortunately,
the explanation given by Forsberg is particularly weak. He maintains that
Japan’s precarious balance of payment position throughout the 1950s
prevented the United States from pressuring Tokyo. However, it can be as easily
argued that Japan should have opened its doors to American multinational
companies, precisely because it was suffering from a dollar shortage. More
realistically, we can say that salvaging Japanese capitalism from within
demanded that the cohesion of Japan’s dominant classes be safeguarded.
Without the network of the yen area, and with a shattered country, the opening
up of the economy to foreign direct investment would have jeopardised the
solidity of the ruling groups and further diminished their legitimacy.
Forsberg’s analysis is weakened by the interpretative angle through
which he views the policies that ushered in Japan’s economic recovery and,
later, the process of accelerated growth. According to the author, the Cold War
and the need to guarantee security, enhanced the leadership capacity of the
American administration. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Acheson battled, not always
successfully, against protectionist tendencies at home as well as sectional
interests abroad. According to Forsberg, American authorities provided global
guidance that remains valid in the light of contemporary economic problems.
Thus the author concludes that “[T]he world will do well if it can match
the record of the United States and Japan during the years after the
Pacific-War.”4
The hegemonic function of the United States nowhere implied stability and
enlightened leadership. From a capitalist perspective the need to put the
Japanese ruling classes firmly back on their feet was understood by Herbert
Hoover before the end of the war. After 1945, the former President counselled
Truman, Marshall, and Patterson against undoing the power of the
Zaibatsus and pleaded for a swift transformation of Japan into a
faithful ally. The international role of the United States did not stem from
the urgency imposed by the external event called the Cold War. On the contrary,
the Cold War was constructed to enforce the rule of international capitalist
relations, especially on the Third World.
Thus began a path that led to a large number of conflicts, most notably in
Asia, culminating in the Vietnam War. It follows that it is impossible to
separate the American support of Japanese recovery from the road that led to
Vietnam. This connection has been captured by Michael Schaller, who in his
seminal study wrote: “The protracted effort to assure Japan access to
Southeast Asia, and to isolate China trapped the United States in a ‘dead
end alley’ of its own device in Vietnam.”5
Forsberg is not alone in providing an undialectical reading of the postwar
period where war and military spending are viewed in terms of enlightened
guidance.6 This romantic
conception of the Cold War era involves two misunderstandings. The first is
historical: the long boom supported by wars was not viable in the long run.
Indeed, during the Vietnam War, economic expansion began to deteriorate first
and foremost through instability in international monetary relations.
Paradoxically, while enriching our knowledge of the period with important
institutional and political information, Forsberg prevents us from grasping the
human and political gravity of the policies that brought the people of Asia at
least two additional decades of destruction. The second misunderstanding is
theoretical. The fact that the imperialist powers maintained a prolonged phase
of prosperity by means of external military stimuli, and imperialist wars,
should make people aware of the fundamental weakness of profit-based economic
and political regimes.
Notes
- In relation to Japan the most significant books are those by
William Borden, The Pacific Alliance (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1984); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Andrew Rotter, The Path to
Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- R. P. Smith, “Military Expenditures and
Capitalism,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, March 1977,
61-76.
- Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 239.
- Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle, 239.
- Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 297.
- Diane Kuntz, Butter and Guns (New York: Free Press,
1997).
JOSEPH HALEVI teaches political
economy at the University of Sydney, and is associated with the center of
development studies, IREPD, at the Université Pierre Mendès
France in Grenoble, France. With Jean-Marc Fontaine he edited Restoring
Demand in the World Economy: Trade, Finance and Technology, (Edward Elgar
Publisher, 1998).
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