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KOREA by Martin Hart-Landsberg |
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Excerpt The division of Korea, one of the defining features of both the North and South Korean experience, has kept millions of Koreans separated from family members and provided justification for denying millions more their democratic rights. The tensions associated with this division still have the potential to trigger a new and more devastating Korean war. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that a majority of Koreans strongly support reunification. What perhaps is surprising is the fact that the governments of North and South Korea, although creations of division, proclaim reunification as their goal. Even the U.S. government, whose policies caused and have prolonged division, advertises its support for Korean reunification. There is only one conclusion to draw from this "universal" endorsement: reunification means different things to different people. As a result, abstract talk about reunification, even to endorse it, does little to clarify the political issues and tasks involved in creating what most Koreans want—a democratic, egalitarian, and independent Korea. This is a serious problem because, although the division of Korea continues to undermine efforts at social change, it is not necessarily true that reunification, regardless of how it is achieved, will be beneficial. The only answer to this problem is to begin thinking about "reunification" as a historically specific political task. Reunification has re-emerged as a "live" political issue during the decade of the 1990s, because of South Korean students' efforts, German reunification, and North Korean economic and political difficulties. Taking advantage of its superior economic and political position, the South Korean government has been able to dominate inter-Korean relations, thereby shaping the way most people in South Korea and the United States think about reunification. Therefore, it is South Korean reunification policy that we must directly confront in our examination of the challenge and promise of reunification. Contrary to what many South Korean and U.S. officials claim, Korean reunification is not a zero-sum game between two governments. Thus rejection of South Korean policy does not require endorsement of North Korean policy. There are alternative policies, and this book concludes by highlighting ways that Koreans and Americans can work together to advance an independent reunification process, one that has the potential to empower people and promote the peaceful establishment of a democratic, egalitarian, and independent Korea. The German Reunification Experience The South Korean approach to reunification has been heavily influenced by the 1990 German reunification experience. German reunification was driven by the rapid economic and political collapse of East Germany and achieved through the incorporation of the East into the West German system. But East Germany did not collapse solely because of internal problems, as the conventional wisdom holds. West German leaders, in an attempt to ensure the dominance of existing West German political and economic institutions in a unified Germany, deliberately and aggressively promoted both the collapse and absorption of the East. Although it has claimed otherwise, the South Korean government seems determined to replicate the achievement of the West German government and accomplish reunification through absorption. Its strategy for achieving this outcome is also the same: first bring about the collapse of the North and then absorb it. However, reunification by absorption was a disaster for the German people, and it would be a disaster for the Korean people as well. Most explanations of the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and its absorption into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) appropriately begin with state socialism's growing economic problems and loss of popular legitimacy during the 1980s. Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union encouraged efforts at reform in a number of Eastern European Communist countries. However, in East Germany, the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) actively resisted even the notion of reform. Frustrated by their government's hard-line position, growing numbers of East Germans decided to leave the GDR. More than 2,000 East Germans escaped to West Germany through Hungary in June 1989. They were followed by 30,000 more in September. Unable to stop the flight of its citizens, the SED was finally forced to grant the right of free travel to the West on November 9. More than 5 million people crossed through the Berlin Wall to visit West Germany in the following four days. According to Western accounts, this opening of the Berlin Wall marks the beginning of the end for the GDR. By this analysis, as large numbers of East Germans gained personal experience of life in the FRG, popular sentiment in favor of the West German system grew uncontrollably. Fearing the consequences of social breakdown in the GDR, the West German government agreed to the fastest form of reunification—reunification through absorption. While this conventional understanding of the German reunification experience is endorsed by most South Korean and U.S. policymakers, it is inaccurate. It is true that demands for reform of East German society did grow during the decade of the 1980s. What is not adequately acknowledged is that while some East Germans, having concluded that change was impossible, looked to escape to West Germany, others worked to create a dynamic civic movement as part of a broader struggle for socialist renewal in the GDR. This civic movement had three main roots: a church-supported peace movement, a secular human rights movement, and an environmental movement. Each began in the early 1980s as small, grassroots efforts at reform. Frustrated by their lack of progress, activists from all three movements gradually began building ties and working together to promote more broad-based political reform. When the government refused to address the root causes of the growing exodus of people from the country, many activists decided the time had come to directly challenge their government's political practice and vision. Their efforts gave rise to a number of new political organizations, including the United Left, New Forum, Democracy Now, and Democratic Awakening in September; the Social Democratic Party in October; and the Green Party in November.1 While these new organizations represented diverse political philosophies and strategies, most of their members shared the goal of creating a vibrant civil society. They also shared an opposition to both capitalism and reunification with West Germany. Significantly, these groups succeeded in giving birth and direction to a powerful protest movement. This movement started in Leipzig on September 4, 1989, when a small group demonstrating for the right of free travel was attacked by police. In response, new demonstrations were held on successive Mondays, each one attracting more people than the last: 5,000 people on September 25, 20,000 on October 2, 70,000 on October 9, and 110,000 on October 16. The demonstrations also became increasingly national. More than 675,000 East Germans demonstrated on October 23 and more than 1 million marched on October 30. Significantly, the demonstrators' demands grew over time, from the right to travel to fundamental political reform. The police, overwhelmed by the size of the demonstrations, were eventually forced to yield the streets to the protesters. The biggest demonstration took place in Berlin on November 4. Approximately 1 million people attended, most chanting slogans calling for "revolutionary renewal." The East German media televised the entire protest. Clearly, more was happening in East Germany than an exodus. A civic revival was taking place as growing numbers of people demonstrated their willingness to struggle to create a political system based on the principle of direct democracy and an economic system based on the principles of worker control, social solidarity, and ecological sustainability. The West German political elite was initially unsure of how to respond to the East German civic movement. To support it meant encouraging its attempt to breathe new life into socialism, something the elite did not want to see happen. Opposing it, however, meant siding with the SED in its struggle to maintain power. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl led the way out of this quandary. By changing the focus of the East German public debate from reform to reunification, he was able to weaken both the civic movement and the SED. Kohl first advocated pursuing reunification in early September 1989 during a parliamentary debate over the appropriate response to the flight of East Germans. He did so again on November 8 (which was after the Berlin rally but before the opening of the Berlin Wall), this time in a major public address. After praising the East German demonstrators for their courage, he called for "free self-determination of all Germans." His message was clear: the West German government wanted East Germans to renounce revolutionary renewal and seek relief through reunification. Both the East German government and its civic opposition rejected this appeal for reunification. The newly elected prime minister, Hans Modrow, did, however, express his willingness to explore "cooperative coexistence" or "a treaty community between two independent states." The civic movement made its position public in a November 26 statement: "Either we can insist on GDR independence" and work to "develop a society of solidarity, offering peace, social justice, individual liberty, free movement, and ecological conversion" or "we must suffer . . . a sell-out of our material and moral values and have the GDR eventually taken over by the Federal Republic."2 Within two weeks, 200,000 people had signed the statement. Undaunted, Kohl pressed ahead with his plan to promote reunification. In response to Modrow's call for closer ties, on November 8 he offered a "Ten-Point Plan for German Unity." Under the terms of the plan, West Germany would provide the GDR with economic assistance, but only after the GDR committed itself to free elections and a market economy. The plan also called for German unity to be firmly grounded in "a common European house," by which Kohl meant that a united Germany would become integrated into Western Europe. In short, this was a plan for East Germany to surrender to West Germany. The East German civic movement struggled to find an alternative to reunification with the West and the status quo of East German state socialism. In an attempt to chart what it called the "Third Way," the civic movement agreed to participate in a national Round Table with the government and other established political parties. The Round Table's work, however, was greatly complicated by the country's growing economic crisis, caused in large part by population flight. The East German government had allowed approximately 30,000 people to emigrate in 1988. Approximately 40,000 had been allowed to leave in the first half of 1989. The total grew to almost 350,000 by the end of the year. Two-thirds of those leaving were skilled workers, and one-sixth had completed college. The loss of so many skilled workers caused a devastating decline in industrial production as well as a breakdown in the country's ability to provide basic social services.3 Hoping that a freely elected government would have sufficient popular support to halt the outflow of people and resulting economic slide, Modrow announced in February 1990 that the date for national elections would be advanced from May to March. He also invited grassroots leaders to join him in an interim government of "national responsibility." The new government quickly proposed a series of political and economic reforms and called upon the West German government to provide financial assistance. Kohl, however, refused to consider giving any aid to the Modrow government, saying that all questions of money would have to wait until after the March elections. Confident that events were moving his way, Kohl continued to raise the specter of East German collapse, hoping to frighten the French and Soviet governments as well as the East Germans into endorsing reunification by absorption. As one measure of his success, Kohl won foreign support for a German currency union which would require the East German government to agree to a market-based economic transformation supported by the introduction of the West German deutschemark (DM). The terms of this proposed currency union were such that the East German government would lose not only its control over the economy, but also its ability to engage in meaningful political negotiations over the terms of reunification. The Round Table, recognizing the political significance of Kohl's proposal, responded by demanding that West Germany stop destabilizing the East and start providing funds to support economic reform. It also made plain its position on reunification: it should be the end result of a gradual process. The final treaty should include a social charter to protect the rights of East Germans, and the new Germany should be committed to the principle of disarmament. The West German government, not surprisingly, rejected the Round Table's demands and reaffirmed its previous position that there would be no economic support until after the March election and that monetary union should be the next step. In effect, Kohl offered East Germans a simple electoral choice: vote for parties favored by the West and receive DMs, followed by a rapid reunification, or vote against the West and receive no assistance. Leaving nothing to chance, West German political parties (with the exception of the Greens) also took steps to directly influence the outcome of the election. Each adopted and directed their opposite number in the East, providing it with speakers, consultants, money, and equipment. Even West German media were used to broadcast election propaganda back to the East. Kohl traveled to the GDR many times to campaign for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-led alliance of conservative parties that he helped form. This alliance supported reunification under the terms of Article 23 of the West German Basic Law, which allowed former states or regions to rejoin (West) Germany. Kohl promised East Germans that a vote for the CDU and its allies would be a vote for "instant prosperity." Kohl's hard work paid off; the Christian Democratic Union and its allies won the election, receiving approximately 48 percent of the vote. Kohl would now be negotiating reunification with his opposite number, Lothar de Maiziere. On July 6, at the first meeting to negotiate the terms of reunification, de Maiziere sought to modify the previously agreed-upon reunification process. He proposed that representatives from both the GDR and the FRG jointly write a "reunification treaty" which would include a statement of the new unified Germany's constitutional goals and economic arrangements. The response of the West German negotiator was as follows: "This is the accession of the GDR to the FRG and not the reverse. We have a good Basic Law that is proven. We want to do everything for you. You are cordially welcome. We do not want to trample coldly on your wishes and interests. But this is not the reunification of two equal states."4 German reunification officially took place on October 3 and it was achieved by the absorption of the East by the West. This process meant that East Germans were denied any opportunity to help create a more democratic Germany. Significantly, the same was true for West Germans. Unification by absorption foreclosed attempts by many West German social groups to secure greater constitutional guarantees for gender equality, multiculturalism, and workers' rights. This history of the German reunification process runs counter to the more widely held view that the collapse of the East left the West with no alternative but to pursue a rapid reunification through absorption. Quite the opposite was true. Kohl had many opportunities to pursue a gradual union of the two Germanys. He rejected several East German initiatives which would have contributed to that goal, the first from the Communist-dominated East German government, the second from the Round Table, and the last from the leader of the eastern CDU. In short, Kohl aggressively pursued a policy designed to ensure the impossibility of a slow and structured reunification process. He achieved his goal of reunification through absorption. The Economic and Social Costs of German Absorption All accounts of German reunification agree that it has been costly. Most analysts say that the East German economy was far weaker and thus needed considerably more support than was expected. However, the reality is that the high costs associated with reunification were largely a consequence of the West's insistence on achieving reunification through absorption. The flight of East Germans to the FRG made economic stabilization difficult for the East German government. Those who remained grew more desperate and envious of West German prosperity. Having rejected previous East German requests for financial support, Kohl announced in February 1990 that the FRG was willing to provide East Germans with DMs, thereby boosting eastern purchasing power, but only if the East German government would agree to his proposed Monetary Union. Although the currency conversion received the greatest attention, the Monetary Union was much more than an agreement regulating the introduction of DMs into East Germany. It actually mandated a complete economic takeover of the GDR by the FRG, requiring the GDR to abolish its planned economy, introduce private enterprise, and accept the West German legal system. The Monetary Union was agreed to by the newly elected CDU-dominated East German government in March 1990. On July 1, East Germans started receiving wages and salaries in West German marks in equal number to what they had been paid in East German marks. Personal debts, on the other hand, were converted at the rate of 2 East German marks to 1 DM. The conversion of East German personal savings was made according to a sliding scale. Children under fifteen years of age were allowed to exchange up to 2,000 East German marks at parity. The level was raised to 4,000 marks for adults under sixty, and to 6,000 marks for those over sixty. Savings held above these levels was exchanged at the rate of 2 East German marks to 1 DM. This conversion plan initially appeared advantageous for East German consumers. The official exchange rate before the monetary agreement was 4.4 East German marks to 1 DM. The agreement, therefore, not only made West German goods more available to those in the East, it also reduced their price. As it turned out, this "advantage" was overwhelmed by other aspects of the agreement. For example, the agreement called for reducing the East German budget deficit by eliminating state subsidies for basic goods and services. Without the subsidies, prices of these goods doubled and in some cases tripled. The agreement also required East Germans to pay new income taxes and contribute to insurance and retirement funds. With both prices and social payments rising, average real disposable income in the East actually fell.5 Most East Germans also experienced a decline in their wealth. Because of the high level of personal savings in East Germany, the effective exchange rate turned out to be approximately 1.8 East German marks to 1 DM; nearly half the value of personal savings was lost in the currency conversion.6 East Germans lost even more as workers than as consumers. East German firms were being forced to compete against their more modern West German counterparts at the same time that the relative cost of West German goods to East German consumers was being reduced. To make matters worse, West German suppliers pressured East German retailers to stock only West German goods. Perhaps not surprisingly, most East Germans used their new DMs to purchase West German goods, causing a noticeable increase in West German production and East German unemployment. East German firms were additionally hampered by the fact that they faced a different currency conversion formula than did individuals. Their liquid assets were converted at the rate of 2 East German marks to 1 DM while their debts were converted at the rate of 1-to-1.7 The resulting financial squeeze forced many firms into bankruptcy. An even more significant blow to the East German economy was the West German insistence on immediate privatization of East German firms. The Round Table had tried to restructure the East German economy by creating a holding company whose mission was to transform state firms into joint stock companies and divide the assets into shares for the government (federal, state, and local), foundations, and individuals. On July 1, following the implementation of the monetary agreement, the holding company was ordered to privatize its assets as quickly as possible. West Germans were put in charge of the process, and they organized it in ways that benefited West German investors at East German expense. For example, they instituted a system of closed bidding, allowing West German firms to purchase the best East German firms at attractive prices. Many of these firms were later shut, having been purchased only to ensure that they would not become competitors.8 Firms that could not be quickly privatized were usually dissolved by the holding company. Business Week described the economic impact of the Monetary Union on eastern Germany as follows:
Kohl's promise to West Germans that reunification would not be costly, and therefore would easily be financed out of economic growth, turned out to be no better than his promise to East Germans that they would enjoy "instant prosperity." The acceleration of eastern Germany's economic decline after the completion of the monetary treaty greatly reduced government revenues in the east, at the same time that the growing unemployment and poverty generated greater demands for assistance. Kohl was finally forced to take action in 1991. He began an Eastern Recovery Program financed by an income tax surcharge of 7.5 percent on west Germans. Additional funds were obtained by large-scale public borrowing. This strategy hit west German workers hard. The borrowing forced interest rates to increase, driving the western German economy into recession in 1993. Moreover, the combination of the recession and desperation of eastern workers gave west German corporations the leverage they needed to break previously binding labor agreements and force western workers to accept lower wages and more "flexible" work rules. Many corporate leaders hoped that the fallout from reunification would eventually enable them to achieve the complete dismantling of the country's social welfare system.10 Most studies of the German reunification experience have been content to define the costs of absorption in narrow economic terms. There was, however, a far uglier side to the absorption process. Central to that process was the deliberate destruction by the FRG of any potential social or ideological threat to the existing West German political economy. For example, all East German universities were ordered to close their departments of Marxism-Leninism and restructure their departments of history, law, economics, philosophy, and education. All faculty in these departments were fired. All East German faculty, regardless of their host department, lost their tenure. Moreover, all faculty members, research associates, and technical administrative personnel were required to complete questionnaires that asked about their political opinions and activities as well as past and present party affiliations. Many were dismissed as a result of their answers. Public school teachers, even daycare and kindergarten teachers, were subjected to a similar "evaluation" process, with similar results.11 Those working in the civil service were also dealt with harshly. The entire East Berlin judiciary was dismissed. In all, approximately 550,000 civil service employees were terminated. The Constitutional Court ruled such actions legal, finding them "necessary in order to construct a modern, efficient administration in accordance with the rule of law quickly."12 In many cases, west Germans, often commuting daily or weekly, were hired to fill administrative positions in eastern Germany. The (West) German state justified these actions by cleverly modifying its traditional anticommunist propaganda. In the past, East Germans had been portrayed in West Germany as helpless victims of communist totalitarianism. After reunification, the German state and media quickly transformed these same victims into active supporters of the past Communist system. Destroying GDR public institutions became insufficient; those who had worked in them also had to be punished. This strategy also enabled the German state to argue that east Germans had only themselves to blame for whatever suffering they experienced after reunification. Although there is no simple way to calculate the costs of reunification by absorption, statistics reveal that they have been enormous. From 1989 to 1993, the birth rate per 1,000 people in eastern Germany fell by 60 percent. From 1989 to 1991, the fertility rate of east German women aged twenty-five to thirty-four fell by over 45 percent. It fell further in 1992, when the number of marriages per 1,000 people was less than half what it had been in 1989. Finally, death rates for men and women aged thirty-five to forty-four rose 20 to 30 percent between 1989 and 1991. As Business Week noted in reporting on these statistics, "Such changes are unprecedented for an industrial country at peace. The drops in births and marriages even eclipsed those that occurred in Germany in the final years of World War II."13 Three main points stand out from the above examination of the German reunification experience. First, the collapse of the GDR was encouraged by deliberate West German state policy. Other outcomes, in terms of both the direction of political change within East Germany and the reunification process, were possible. Second, the West German state pursued reunification through absorption because it wanted to ensure the economic and political hegemony of existing West German institutions in a new unified Germany. Third, absorption has been an economic and social disaster for working people in eastern Germany, as well as politically and economically costly for working people in western Germany. Despite the significant historical and political differences between the German and Korean situations, the German reunification experience is pertinent to discussion of Korean reunification. At a minimum, it provides a useful starting point for developing criteria for evaluating Korean reunification strategies. But its relevance is far greater than that. South Korean leaders, motivated by political imperatives similar to those of their West German counterparts, also seek reunification through absorption. South Korea's reunification strategy is designed to maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the North, in hopes of precipitating its collapse. Such a strategy, given the outcome of the German experience, holds no promise of producing results compatible with the desires of most Koreans. The Evolution of South Korean Reunification Policy South Korea's reunification strategy has always been influenced by the relative balance of power between itself and North Korea. Until the early 1970s, South Korea rejected outright all North Korean initiatives to advance inter-Korean relations and reunification because, being less stable than the North, it feared the outcome of negotiations. For example, after the end of the Korean War, North Korea made several proposals to increase North-South contact, including political conferences, economic and cultural exchanges, mutual visiting privileges, and the signing of a peace treaty. In 1960, Kim Il Sung offered a plan for achieving reunification through the formation of a confederation of the two Koreas. According to the plan, North and South Korea would continue to maintain their own distinct socioeconomic systems but the increased contact made possible by confederation would eventually allow for Korea-wide elections and the establishment of a unified Korean government. Park Chung Hee, after he took power in the 1961 coup, specifically opposed any negotiations with the North, citing the need to first develop South Korea's economic and military strength. South Korea's rapid economic growth eventually shifted the economic and military advantage away from the North, enabling Park to offer the North a negotiating challenge. He called for a North-South Competition of Good Will in the early 1970s, offering a set of proposals for "normalizing" North-South relations. These involved humanitarian, cultural, and economic exchanges, and perhaps most importantly, the simultaneous admission of both North and South Korea into the United Nations. The North rejected these proposals, arguing that they were designed not to advance the reunification process, but to allow the South to secure a stable division of the peninsula. The North called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South, the signing of a peace treaty between North and South, the formation of a confederation, and the establishment of a single, shared UN delegation. Park, in turn, rejected these proposals, arguing that North Korea's unwillingness to agree to "confidence-building measures" showed that it was not serious about reunification, but only interested in dominating the South. Kim Il Sung's 1980 proposal for achieving reunification through confederation (which he called the Koryo Democratic Confederated Republic) went largely unanswered by the South until 1989, when Roh Tae Woo presented his Korean National Community Unification Formula. Roh's proposal called for confidence-building measures leading to the adoption of a Korean National Community Charter that would include ground rules for the establishment of a Korean Commonwealth. The Korean Commonwealth was expected to create an environment where agreement would eventually be reached on a constitution for a united Korea and a Korea-wide voting process to approve it. The Korean National Community Unification Formula, adopted with slight modification by Kim Young Sam, was designed to close the negotiating gap between the North and South. In spite of its greater detail, it remained true to the basic structure of previous South Korean initiatives, all of which demanded that cultural, social, and economic exchanges take place before the start of negotiations to settle political and military issues. This basic structure was the reverse of the North Korean approach. For example, the Korean Commonwealth arrangement was designed to encourage North and South Korea to develop closer social and economic relationships while operating as two independent states when dealing with political and military issues. In contrast, the Koryo Democratic Confederated Republic arrangement was designed to encourage North and South Korea to develop unified political and military policies while maintaining separate socioeconomic systems. With each side restating, in more elaborate form, the same proposal that had already been rejected by the other side, it is not surprising that little progress was made during the 1970s and 1980s in furthering inter-Korean relations or reunification.14 The stalemate reflected the fact that neither Korean government was seriously interested in promoting an open reunification process. Each thought of itself as the only legitimate government in Korea. Each therefore offered new reunification proposals largely in order to boost its own domestic and international standing at the expense of its rival. This stalemate also reflected the fact that neither side was economically or politically powerful enough to force the other to give diplomatic ground. The first serious departure from this relative equilibrium in the balance of power between the two Korean governments came in the late 1980s with South Korea's successful promotion of its Northern Policy. The roots of this policy, which helped to lay the groundwork for the later pursuit of reunification through absorption, are found in Park Chung Hee's 1973 initiative to "open [South Korea's] doors to all the nations of the world . . . [and have] those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us."15 This new approach to the socialist world, loosely based on West Germany's Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy), was adopted in part because earlier attempts to isolate the North had failed and in part because of U.S. pressure.16 However, in spite of numerous South Korean initiatives, the Northern Policy produced few benefits for South Korea during either Park's or Chun's rule. The breakthrough for the Northern Policy finally came in 1988. The conventional wisdom is that it was achieved largely because of President Roh Tae Woo's decision that, in contrast to the past, the country's overtures to the socialist world would no longer be motivated by an attempt to strengthen the South at the expense of the North. In a July 7 address, he said that South Korea was "willing to co-operate with North Korea in its efforts to improve relations with countries friendly to us, including the United States and Japan; and in tandem with this, we will continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries."17 Hong Chul Yum, Roh's presidential secretary, described the difference between Roh's approach to reunification and those of past South Korean presidents as follows:
Actually, the only thing new about South Korea's Northern Policy was its effectiveness. During the second half of the 1980s, many socialist countries were actively pursuing greater foreign trade and investment as part of a broader program of market-based economic reforms. South Korea was able to take advantage of this development and use the many contacts generated by its hosting of the 1988 Olympics to negotiate a number of new economic agreements with these countries. Full diplomatic relations followed soon after: with Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia in 1989; with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR in 1990. In return, Hungary received $450 million in aid, Poland $500 million, and the Soviet Union $3 billion. South Korean relations with China developed more slowly but, by 1990, each country had opened an official trade office in the other's capital; full diplomatic relations were established in 1992. South Korea's diplomatic success was not, public pronouncements to the contrary, coupled with any fundamental change in the government's approach toward North Korea. As in the past, it sought to use its diplomatic gains to isolate and weaken the North. The issue of UN membership offers perhaps the best illustration of this—and of the changing balance of power between the two Korean governments. South Korea had proposed, as early as 1973, that both North and South Korea become members of the United Nations. The North, with support from the Soviet Union and China, had firmly opposed this plan. In 1990, South Korea announced that it would pursue its own membership in the United Nations and that it had no interest in discussing the issue with the North. This time, primarily because of its new international connections, it was able to convince both the Soviet Union and China to support its application. The North was left with no choice but to announce, as it did in May 1991, that it would also seek membership in the United Nations. South Korea achieved its victory in September with the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the United Nations. Pursuing Reunification by Absorption When Roh made his 1988 declaration calling for a new and more cooperative relationship with the North, it is unlikely that the South Korean government had any real interest in or expectation of greater contact with the North. The declaration was made to offset domestic pressures and to support the Northern Policy. An openly hostile policy to the DPRK would have made it more difficult for socialist countries to accept closer relations with South Korea. However, developments over the next two years caused South Korean planners to rethink their policy toward the North. Between 1988 and 1990, South Korea's international gains were matched by North Korean setbacks, including the disappearance of the Eastern European socialist community. Then came the single most important factor encouraging the change in South Korean attitudes about contact with the North: the 1990 reunification of Germany. As a professor at the South Korean National Defense College noted:
South Korean policymakers drew two conclusions from these developments. One, reunification by absorption was also possible in Korea. Two, this outcome required maximum contact between North and South to "open up" and destabilize the North. Knowing that the North was in need of foreign investment to reverse its economic decline, the South Korean government held out the promise of substantial economic support if the North would agree to humanitarian, cultural, and economic exchanges with the South and open its nuclear program to outside inspection. This offer of assistance had nothing to do with implementing Roh's Korean National Community Unification Formula. Rather, it was an offer inspired by the German experience. South Korean planners hoped that a policy of "engagement" could be used to create opportunities for undermining the North Korean regime, thereby producing majority support in both the North and South for reunification by absorption. The North rejected the proposed exchanges and international nuclear inspections. In response, Kim Il Sung issued a call for negotiations to settle key political and military issues, a "Grand National Congress" to lay the groundwork for reunification through confederation, and an end to the U.S. military presence in the South. Well aware of South Korean governmental thinking, he also declared in his 1991 New Year's address that the South should have no illusions about achieving a German-style reunification. By late 1991, some South Korean policy analysts, having had more time to study the "economic" costs of German reunification, began to voice their own doubts about the desirability of replicating the German experience. For example, the Korean Development Institute, a South Korean government-affiliated think tank, determined that a sudden and unplanned Korean reunification, such as took place in Germany, might come with a ten-year price tag of $800 billion. The South Korean government would have added yearly expenses of approximately $47 billion for each of the first four years, an amount approximately equal to the government's yearly budget at the time. A slower, planned reunification would, according to the institute, greatly reduce these costs; estimated government expenditures would be cut by more than half.20 By mid-1992, the Roh administration appeared to have been won over. Officials publicly announced their support for a gradual, as opposed to rapid, reunification by absorption. Kim Young Sam adopted a similar line, expressing his willingness to work with the North to help it stabilize and reform its economy. Significantly, analysts of almost all political persuasions in South Korea took the government at its word. One result is that popular discussion of reunification strategies largely ended. Most South Koreans, fearing the potential chaos and cost of a North Korean collapse, seem content to leave the policy initiative in government hands. This is a serious mistake. One of the important lessons of the German reunification experience is that while gradual reunification is possible, gradual reunification by absorption is not. The FRG was able to absorb the GDR only because of the prior collapse of the East German regime. A viable East German government would not have accepted its own total destruction. It would have demanded, as part of a gradual process of reunification, the creation of new German institutions. That, however, is precisely what the West German elite did not want, and that is why the West German government repeatedly refused to offer economic support to the GDR and why the economic costs associated with absorption were of secondary concern to the West German government. (To the extent that those costs are expressed through lower wages and weaker unions, moreover, they are being paid disproportionately by German workers, not West German political and corporate leaders.) South Korean policymakers seem well aware of this lesson. Recognizing that gradual reunification by absorption is impossible, they remain committed to absorption at the expense of gradualism. For the South Korean elite, the potential economic and social costs associated with the collapse of the North Korean regime pale in significance with the benefits, most importantly, the strengthening and expansion of existing South Korean political and economic relations and institutions. Business Korea makes this point by highlighting one reason the South Korean elite fears gradualism:
An examination of South Korean government policy toward the North provides the best proof that the collapse and absorption of the DPRK remains the official policy goal of the ROK. South Korean Economic Policy Toward the North As part of its Northern Policy, the South Korean government lifted its embargo on (indirect) trade with North Korea in October 1988. Total trade (indirect and processing) rose from $1 million in 1988 to between $200 and $300 million a year during the first half of the 1990s. At the same time, the South Korean government continues to disallow the kind of inter-Korean economic cooperation that has the potential to transform the North Korean economy: large-scale South Korean chaebol investment and technology transfer. In February 1989, the group chairman of Hyundai, with South Korean government encouragement, visited North Korea. While there he negotiated several agreements, including one to develop a major tourist resort. Shortly after his return to Seoul, however, the South Korean government withdrew its permission for the project. Similarly, in January 1992, the group chairman of Daewoo visited the North, again with government encouragement. While there he negotiated a number of agreements, including participation in several joint ventures to produce light manufactures in the Nampo industrial estate. Yet within a month of his return, the South Korean government ordered a halt to Daewoo's participation in these ventures. In November, it went further, ordering a total ban on all inter-Korean economic cooperation projects. The official reason given for the ban was North Korea's unwillingness to open its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. Yet, North Korea did allow the IAEA to make six separate inspections during 1992. It did not announce its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty until March 1993. Even then, according to an economic consultant writing in The Korea Economic Weekly, "Throughout the crisis over North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, Southern companies detected no change in their Northern counterparts' willingness to do business."22 Significantly, it is the South Korean government that seeks to place limits on inter-Korean economic cooperation. It will readily allow only indirect and processing trade, not the substantial investments sought by the North Korean government. Such limits clearly run counter to South Korean government pronouncements: the South Korean government argued for economic exchanges before political and military negotiations, and it had announced its desire to support economic reform in the North in order to avoid its economic collapse. South Korean government claims that its ban on inter-Korean economic cooperation was caused by North Korea's unwillingness to clarify its nuclear intentions were put to the test by the October 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement to freeze North Korea's existing nuclear program and replace its old graphite-moderated reactors with militarily less dangerous light-water ones. In response to this agreement, South Korean president Kim Young Sam announced a partial lifting of restrictions. But while this policy change allowed Southern firms to visit the North to conduct feasibility studies, encouraged more reprocessing trade, and allowed Southern companies to train Northern workers, actual investment remained carefully controlled. If granted permission, South Korean firms are allowed to invest in the North, but with an upper limit of approximately $5 million a project. The first approvals were issued in May 1995. Kohap was given permission to invest $4.5 million in four projects for the manufacture of toys and textiles, and Daewoo won permission for a $5 million investment in three projects designed to produce shirts, bags, and jackets. By comparison, Daewoo announced, almost at the same time, plans for a $300 million consumer electronics factory in Vietnam. In April 1996, three additional firms were give permission to enter business deals with North Korean enterprises. But as before, the approved investments were limited in scope and size. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the government will allow these projects to move beyond the permission stage. South Korea has also sought to limit investment in the North by other countries. For example, when the European Community Chamber of Commerce in (South) Korea expressed interest in exploring investment possibilities in North Korea, the South Korean government refused permission for a North Korean trade official to come to Seoul to make a presentation.23 Actions such as these support only one conclusion: the South has no real interest in stabilizing the North Korean economy. South Korean Policy toward Japanese-North Korean Relations Roh claimed, in his July 7 declaration, that he was ready to "cooperate with North Korea for improving its relations" with the United States and Japan. The Japanese government responded by declaring that it was ready to negotiate with North Korea on all issues related to Japanese-North Korean relations. Unofficial talks between North Korean and Japanese officials began in Pyongyang in September 1990. The talks concluded with an informal understanding that the two governments would meet soon and that as part of the normalization process, Japan would apologize for its past colonial exploitation and pay compensation to the North Korean government. Official talks did begin in 1991, but rather than encourage their success, South Korean authorities did what they could to limit their significance. The South Korean government, with strong U.S. support, got the Japanese government to agree not to offer any money to North Korea until relations between the two countries were fully normalized, to press the North to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, and to do nothing to threaten "meaningful progress" in North-South relations.24 It is worth emphasizing that South Korea's attempt to slow the normalization process between Japan and North Korea occurred after the South had already normalized relations with the Soviet Union and was well on its way to establishing full diplomatic relations with China. The South Koreans hoped that by linking payment of compensation to normalization of relations, they could keep North Korea from receiving Japanese funds for a considerable period of time. The North Koreans, however, surprised both the South Koreans and Japanese by expressing interest in a quick settlement of all outstanding issues between Japan and North Korea and the establishment of full diplomatic relations as soon as possible. The Japanese, under U.S. pressure, raised the issue of IAEA inspections in response. The North approved the nuclear safeguards agreement in January 1992. The Japanese then demanded implementation, and IAEA inspections began in May. The Japanese then demanded information about a Japanese woman allegedly kidnapped by the North. Convinced that the Japanese were stalling, the North withdrew from the talks in November 1992. While Japan appears to have respected South Korea's wishes when dealing with North Korea, it was primarily U.S. pressure that secured Japanese compliance. Almost immediately after the United States and North Korea signed their October 1994 agreement ending the controversy surrounding North Korea's nuclear program, the Japanese declared their interest in renewing their dialogue with the North Korean government. However, South Korea's opposition to such talks has not lessened. In October 1995, in response to Japanese moves to provide rice aid to the North and resume normalization talks, Kim Young Sam warned, "If Japan seeks to improve ties with North Korea by dealing over the head of South Korea, this will give [the South Korean people] the impression that Japan is obstructing reunification of the two Koreas. . . . The Japanese moves to improve ties with North Korea ahead of us will not be in Japan's best interest."25 The South Korean government continues to actively oppose any Japanese initiatives to normalize relations with North Korea. Such efforts, which are contrary to official South Korean claims that it desires to help North Korea emerge from its diplomatic isolation, make sense only as part of an overall strategy designed to keep North Korea under crisis. South Korean Policy toward U.S.-North Korean Relations The U.S. government responded to Roh's July 7 declaration by announcing that it would allow U.S. diplomats to meet with their North Korean counterparts, limited academic and cultural exchanges, and the sale of humanitarian goods to the North. North Korean and U.S. diplomats engaged in twenty-three counselor-level talks between December 1988 and May 1992, most often to discuss U.S. charges that North Korea was pursuing the production of nuclear weapons. In 1990, the United States accused North Korea of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The North denied the accusation and refused to accept unconditional international inspection of its facilities. Over the following years, the United States attempted to organize a UN-sponsored embargo of the North and threatened military action. Both the embargo and war were averted, however, when Jimmy Carter visited North Korea in June 1994 and won agreement for a new round of high-level U.S.-North Korean talks. In spite of Kim Il Sung's death in July, these talks led to the previously discussed October agreement that was designed to guarantee the nonmilitary nature of the North's nuclear program as well as encourage better U.S.-North Korean relations. Since the South Korean government had publicly stated its desire to help the North avoid economic collapse and improve its relations with the United States, and would presumably not want a new Korean war, it should have been pleased with the agreement. The opposite was true. In an article headlined "South Korea President Lashes Out at U.S.," the New York Times reported that Kim Young Sam:
The Financial Times (London) described Kim's actions as follows:
The South Korean government reacted sharply to U.S. willingness to negotiate with the DPRK because a thaw in U.S.-DPRK relations would make it virtually impossible for the ROK to keep the North isolated and in crisis. The South Korean government believes, as does the North Korean government, that normalization of relations between the United States and the DPRK would likely unlock both American and Japanese loans and investments. It could also reduce the need for the North to spend such a higher percentage of its GDP on defense. As a result of the October agreement, the U.S. government followed the North in dropping a number of restrictions that formally limited exchanges between the two countries. But these first steps toward better U.S.-North Korean relations, while noteworthy, are still largely of symbolic value. Moreover, the October agreement between the two countries is sufficiently vague on a number of key points that differences of opinion leading to renewed tensions between the United States and North Korea remain a serious possibility. Taking no chances, the South Korean government appears determined to establish a veto over U.S. policy initiatives toward the North. Its strategy is to demand that the United States make any further improvements in U.S.-North Korean relations conditional on prior improvements in North-South relations. Only if Washington agrees to this demand can the South hope to sustain its strategy for achieving the collapse and absorption of the North. The South Korean government's latest worry is the North Korean campaign to replace the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War fighting with a peace treaty. The South is in a relatively weak position to oppose this campaign; having refused to sign the armistice in 1953, it has no clear legal foundation from which to demand a role in its revision or replacement. Nevertheless, the South Korean government adamantly opposes any U.S.-North Korean talks on the subject. As the Korea Times explains:
Worried about its ability to sustain this position, given what appears to be a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward accommodation with the North, the South Korean government worked with the United States to frame a counterproposal. Presented in April 1996, this counterproposal called for North Korea to join the United States, South Korea, and China in four-power talks aimed at "replacing the armistice with a permanent peace settlement." This call for talks appeared to represent a new South Korean willingness to accept a North Korean-U.S. dialogue as part of a broader effort to resolve tensions on the peninsula. In reality, however, it represented little more than a clever repackaging of the status quo. The South Korean government won U.S. agreement that the ROK would be the sole negotiator with the DPRK in matters relating to peace and security on the peninsula. The U.S.-DPRK conversation would be limited to bilateral issues such as North Korean missile exports and the return of the remains of U.S. soldiers killed during the Korean War.29 Not surprisingly, the North Koreans have found the ground rules for the four-power talks unsatisfactory. It is unclear how long the United States will continue to back South Korea's foreign policy. What is clear is that South Korea continues to publicly misrepresent the aim of its own policy toward the North. On March 1, 1996, for example, Kim Young Sam said, "What our republic wants is cooperation and common prosperity with North Korea to pave the way for reunification, not the collapse of North Korea."30 But South Korea's policies have been designed to achieve the exact opposite—the collapse and absorption of the North. An Alternative Approach to Reunification There are two main reasons for opposing South Korea's reunification by absorption strategy. First, as the German experience reveals, reunification by absorption is designed to strengthen existing class relations and institutions, not promote economic, political, or social reform. While the South Korean elite may be satisfied with existing arrangements, the majority of South Koreans are not. Significantly, even official South Korean government surveys on citizen attitudes toward reunification show a high degree of "support for reunification, and support for a system different from the current South Korean system . . . a sign that reunification may be viewed by some citizens as an opportunity and a method for bringing about system change."31 Reunification by absorption would only make it harder to achieve the desired systemic change. The second reason is that even though it is unlikely that the South Korean strategy will succeed, the government's continuing effort comes with a high price tag. The strategy has greatly increased the economic suffering and international isolation of those who live in the North. By ensuring a continuation of hostile relations with the North, it has also enabled the South Korean government to continue using the existing National Security Law to repress those who seek educational, workplace, and political reform in the South. In fact, NSL arrests are on the rise. During the 1980s, an average of 220 people were arrested each year for violating the NSL. During the first half of the 1990s, yearly arrests averaged well over 300.32 In addition, the continuing tension on the Korean peninsula, which the South Korean strategy helps to sustain, provides a cover of legitimacy for militarists throughout the region, not to mention greatly increasing the risk of a new Korean war. There are things that can be done to force the South Korean government to change its strategy. Within South Korea, those who favor reunification without absorption must find ways to help people better understand the nature of the German experience. They must also help expose the ways that their government, despite its public statements, continues to pursue reunification by absorption. Within the United States, people must find ways to pressure the U.S. government to pursue a more independent and balanced policy toward North Korea, including ending war games (which continue even though Team Spirit has ended), signing a peace treaty, withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, and normalizing economic and political relations. The chances for success are greater than they have been in the past because of the current lack of consensus among U.S. policymakers. A more independent U.S. policy toward North Korea is also likely to encourage the normalization of relations between Japan and the DPRK. If achieved, these developments can be expected to enable the North to stabilize its own political and economic situation and approach the reunification dialogue with the South on more equal terms. If the Southern strategy for reunification by absorption were abandoned it would not, of course, necessarily mean that the governments of North and South Korea would end their mutual hostility and agree to implement a reunification process responsive to the needs and desires of all Koreans. Both governments will still want to control the reunification dialogue for their own purposes, and as long as they are able to resist popular participation in it, meaningful progress toward the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, and independent Korea is unlikely. This resistance must therefore be challenged and overcome. Overcoming this resistance in the South will require the same kind of popular mobilization that eventually forced the military dictatorship to grant political concessions. But that mobilization must still be organized. At present, most South Koreans remain confused about North Korean intentions and the consequences of reunification. Believing that further progress can be made in democratizing South Korean society regardless of the state of the reunification dialogue, they therefore direct their energies toward achieving the former, allowing the government to pursue the latter at its own discretion. Activists can change this situation only by making visible the strong and direct link between democratization and popular involvement in the reunification process.33 Educators, for example, should strive to show those who support educational reform that their efforts will always be bounded as long as national security concerns are used to limit what scholars can study and teachers teach. For labor activists, likewise, workplace democracy will always be frustrated as long as national security concerns are used to limit worker organizing and collective action. As a part of this process, ways must be found to connect popular reform efforts directly to the reunification process. Growing numbers of South Koreans have become involved in movements to protect the environment, for example. Those involved must be encouraged and supported in their efforts to meet with North Koreans who share similar concerns, so that both groups can begin discussing ways to ensure that reunification will strengthen respect for the environment rather than open up new areas to be despoiled. One such meeting did take place in Thailand in May 1996. Such discussions can lead to connections that strengthen environmental movements in both the North and South, and can provide insights into how an environmentally sustainable development strategy can be shaped as part of the reunification process. Similarly, members of the South Korean teachers union should be encouraged to meet with their North Korean counterparts to discuss educational reform—in particular, ways to develop and implement a curriculum capable of promoting a new national identity based on respect for the principles of democracy and social solidarity. Women should also be encouraged to continue their existing inter-Korean dialogue over the meaning of women's rights and ways to structure a reunification process that protects and deepens those rights. Greater contact between South Korean social groups and North Korean officials and organizations will certainly make it harder for either government to restrict or narrow the reunification dialogue. This strategy will not be easy to implement. The South Korean government continues to use "national security" fears to restrict contacts between South Koreans and individuals and groups in the North. Following the government's May 1996 declaration that student and labor organizing had reached a "critical point," the Korea Herald editorialized against "the increasingly vehement and irrational nature" of student activism. It singled out for special notice the open exchanges of letters and faxed messages between North and South Korean students. The editorial went on to call for an immediate halt to contacts, arguing that "reunifying the divided peninsula is a matter to be resolved between governing powers, not between individuals."34 Likewise, when a Canadian university student opened a web site in June 1996, on which he posted material obtained while on a trip to North Korea, the South Korean government took immediate steps to block access to it on national security grounds. The New York Times quoted the assistant defense minister as follows: "If we don't do anything about North Korean propaganda, then maybe our high school or university students can be ill-informed by their articles. Ordinary people do not have the information and knowledge and understanding to know what is working and what is good."35 South Korean activists continue to risk imprisonment for trying to overcome government opposition to their participation in the reunification dialogue. People living in the United States can extend their solidarity to South Korean activists and make a difference in the struggle by becoming better informed and more outspoken about the repressive nature of the South Korean government and its use of the National Security Law. They can pressure the U.S. government to depart from its historical pattern and foster a more open political environment in South Korea. The strategy outlined above for the South will not work in the North. The DPRK has few, if any, autonomous social groups. All organizations appear to be under tight government control and thus do not have the independent perspective of the social movement groups in the South. This fact does not, however, lead to the conclusion that pursuing the kinds of meetings suggested above is a waste of time. As long as people from the DPRK are willing to participate in the dialogue, the process will be useful. At a minimum it will help those in the South better understand North Korean perspectives, thereby enabling them to participate more effectively in reunification discussions in the South. These meetings become even more valuable if South Korean government planners and U.S. military officials are correct that the Northern regime will soon collapse. Then only Southern movement groups and the popular understanding of reunification possibilities they are able to communicate will stand in the way of an absorption process designed to limit progressive social change. If the North is not about to collapse (a more likely scenario), then these meetings can also promote more independent thinking on the part of North Korean social groups. North Koreans are not robots incapable of reasoning and feeling. The more opportunities they have for dialogue with those seeking progressive social change in the South, the more their own understandings of progressive possibilities are bound to grow. Those living in the United States can also help encourage both the development of more independent social groups in the North and their participation in the reunification dialogue. One way is to work to dismantle the South Korean NSL; this would make North-South contacts much easier to arrange. Another way is to create opportunities for North Koreans (including environmentalists, teachers, leaders of women's groups, health care professionals, students, and professors) to meet with Americans who are working for social change. Such contacts are bound to contribute to the creation of a more open and productive environment for North-South communication. They are also likely to contribute to a reduction in U.S.-North Korean military tensions. Achieving Korean reunification will not be simple. However, Korean history is rich in telling experiences, including many heroic attempts by Koreans to build a more humane and democratic society. Alternative visions for Korean society, including those which have enjoyed majority support, were often crushed by one or both of the governments that claim to represent Korea. These experiences also make clear that the U.S. government bears enormous responsibility for Korea's division and current political situation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they teach that there are no shortcuts; progress requires building strong and democratic social movements whose practice can also inspire international solidarity. At this moment in history, combined efforts may significantly advance the process of creating a democratic, egalitarian, and independent Korea. The benefits that would follow—especially reduced military tensions in Asia, and the inspiration of successful social change—extend well beyond Korea and would be to the decided advantage of most Americans, as well. After more than fifty years of division, it is time to erase the "imaginary line." For reference notes, please contact Renee Pendergrass at the Monthly Review Press office. MARTIN HART-LANDSBERG is professor of economics at Lewis and Clark College in Oregon. He is also the author of Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea (Monthly Review Press, 1993). 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